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The experiment presented in this video constructs a heterogeneous duopoly of firms – on the one hand a firm with an internal structure leading to low prices, and on the other hand a firm acting collusively in price-setting. MICHAEL KURSCHILGEN explains that transparency about the competitor’s internal structure hampers tacit collusion: If the collusive firm is aware of the other firm’s internal structure, the firms will compete on prices and prices will decline; otherwise, both firms will collude on price-setting and prices will rise.
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21036/LTPUB10021
Institution
Technical University of Munich (Technische Universität München)
"Technische Universität München (TUM) is one of Europe’s top universities. It is committed to excellence in research and teaching, interdisciplinaryeducation and the active promotion of promising young scientists. The university also forges strong links with companies and scientific institutionsacross the world. TUM was one of the first universities in Germany to be named a University of Excellence. Moreover, TUM regularly ranks among the best European universities in international rankings." ( Source )
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Original publication
Partnerships and Consortia: The Effect of Sharing Rules on Oligopolistic Pricing
Unpublished
Published in 0
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